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NOTICE TO MINORS UNDER THE ILLINOIS
JUVENILE COURT ACT:
AN ANOMALY OF DUE PROCESS
Susan L. Brody*
INTRODUCTION
Child abuse has always been a topic of major concern to civilized cultures.'
Although the common law and the United States Constitution have protected
parental rights to raise children, the law has also recognized a right, on
behalf of society, to intervene when the child's safety or well being is in
danger.2 In 1899, Illinois implemented that right through the legislative
process when it adopted the first Juvenile Court Act in the nation.3
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Brody is an assistant professor at The John Marshall Law School and Director of the School's
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concentrated in family law and appellate practice. She also served as law clerk to the Hon.
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preparation of this Article.
1. See Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and
Social Perspective, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972). See also Chicago Tribune, Oct. 5, 1986, at 1,
col. 3 (current concerns about child abuse in Illinois).
2. The common law of England gave the family, particularly the father, almost absolute
control over the children. E.g., King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1804) (absent proof
of abuse of child by father, father has legal right to custody). However, the Crown could
intervene as guardian of the child's interests under the parens patriae theory. E.g., Wellesley
v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1829) (where father is found to be morally unfit, guardian for
his children may be appointed by the court).
Similarly, the fourteenth amendment was construed to protect parental rights. E.g., Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (fourteenth amendment includes individual's right to establish
a home and raise children). These constitutional rights are subordinated, however, when the
state's interest in child protection and welfare exists. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (parents may not require minor to engage in prohibited commercial activity).
3. 1899 I11. Laws 131 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 169 (1901) (repealed 1965).
The Illinois Act was the first juvenile court act in the nation and the idea spread rapidly to
Illinois' sister states. B. KRISBERG & J. AUSTIN, THE CHIDREN OF ISHMAEL: CRICA. PEaSPEC-
Ttvas ON JUVENILE JusTicE 26-27 (1978) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES]. By 1909, 10 states had
juvenile courts, 22 states would have juvenile courts by 1912, and by 1925, all but 2 states
would adopt specialized courts for children. Id. at 27. According to one commentator, the
Illinois juvenile court movement would sweep over America "like ... prairie fires." Ketcham,
Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 585, 586 (1965-1966) [hereinafter
Renaissance].
Compare S. KATZ, M. McGRATH & R. HOWE, CHILD NEGLECT LAWS IN AMERICA (1976)
(reviewing child abuse laws of the 50 states) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1974) (amended
1986) (Federal Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act).
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The Illinois statutory treatment of abused and neglected children was,
however, couched in terms of that era. Apparently in an effort designed to
treat all related problems with comprehensive, all-inclusive legislation, a
practice still in existence more than 90 years later, 4 the Juvenile Court Act
consolidated all "juvenile" problems into one legislative answer.' Thus,
juvenile delinquency and child abuse were, at least to those 1899 legislators,
of the same mold6 because the legislature made no distinction between the
two.
This overbroad treatment created problems concerning the various "ju-
venile" topics that the Act purportedly addressed, especially those regarding
notice. The state had to consider the rights of the parents when "abuse"
wrongs were alleged, the rights of the minor when "delinquency" wrongs
were involved, and the rights of the state when "societal" wrongs were
raised. The level of notice to each of those parties had to be commensurate
with the nature of the right protected. 7 The legislature, however, enacted a
uniform notice requirement applicable to all juvenile concerns,8 resulting in
twisted and contorted dispositions that undermined the purposes of the Act.9
This Article will focus on the unconscionable results that the Juvenile
Court Act's notice requirement imposes on abused and neglected children.
In particular, the General Assembly's failure to treat abused or neglected
children differently from delinquent children will be severely criticized,10
4. For an example of the federal government's attempt to correct budget deficits in one
all-inclusive act, see The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-920) (1985)), which was ruled partially un-
unconstitutional in Bowsher v. Syner, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
5. The text of the 1899 Act purported to affect:
[A]ny child who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or dependent
upon the public for support; or has not proper parental care or guardianship; or
who habitually begs or receives alms; or is found living in any house of ill fame
or with any vicious or disreputable person, or whose home, by reason of neglect,
cruelty or depravity on the part of its parents, guardian or other persons in 'Whose
care it may be, is an unfit place for such child; and any child under the age of ten
(10) years who is found begging, peddling or selling any article, or singing or
playing any musical instrument upon the street, or giving any public entertainment,
or who accompanies or is used in aid of any person so doing. [Further] any child
under the age of sixteen (16) years who violates any law of this State or any city
or village ordinance; or who is incorrigible; or who is growing up in idleness or
crime; or who knowingly frequents a house of ill fame; or who knowingly patronizes
any policy shop or place where any gaming devise is, or shall be operated.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, para. 169 (1901) (repealed 1965).
6. The original 1899 Act used the term "child negligence" for what is now commonly
referred to as "child abuse." Id.
7. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 173 (1901) (repealed 1965). The notice requirement applied
to all matters under the Juvenile Court Act and mandated that a summons be served to the
person having custody or control of the minor. Id.
9. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
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although the Illinois General Assembly has recently attempted to rebalance
the notice requirement of the historically combined child abuse and juvenile
delinquency problems." Only when this legislative linking of child abuse to
delinquency is severed will child welfare be preserved.
I. PRE-1986 CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION
A. The parens patriae model
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act was enacted on April 21, 1899, the first
such enactment in the United States.12 The Act was a legislative answer to
the appalling treatment of juvenile offenders in the custody of Illinois
correctional facilities; 3 however, it had an effect on abused as well as
delinquent children. Based upon the parens patriae theory, 4 the juvenile
"court" was created to determine when the state may intervene on behalf
of a child's care.'5 In this sense, the 1899 Act recognized that the family
had the primary responsibility for child care and legislatively made the state
11. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13. In the late 1800s, Illinois was suffering from several setbacks in its treatment of
juveniles. PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 26. The state had few institutions for the care of
juveniles. Most early institutions or reform schools had been destroyed in fires, and those
remaining were essentially prisons for children. Id. The state attempted to finance privately a
system of institutional care but failed. Id. Famed Chicago social worker reformers, like Jane
Addams, Julia Lathrop, and Lucy Flowers, mobilized the Chicago Womens Club to seek
juvenile justice reform. Id. Governor John Altgeld responded, and appointed Ms. Lathrop to
visit existing Illinois correctional institutions. Kopecky, Juvenile Law and Practice, 1982 ILL.
INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 1-1, 1-5 [hereinafter Lawl. Ms. Lathrop then approached
members of the Chicago Bar Association with a report of her observations and enlisted their
help in drafting a tentative juvenile reform act. Id. The Bar drafted the initial bill which became
the Juvenile Court Act. Id. For a full discussion of the origin of the 1899 Act, see T. HURLEY,
ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW 9-52 (3d ed. 1907).
14. Parens patriae, literally translated, means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). The theory originates from English common law, where the
King could act as a guardian of persons with legal disabilities, such as infants, idiots, and
lunatics. Id. Under parens patriae, the state or society as a whole has the duty to protect those
unable to care for themselves. Law, supra note 13, at 1-7.
15. Law, supra note 13, at 1-7. The court determines when intervention is necessary and
appropriate, and further assures that supportive services are provided. Id. Although the court
may provide the services itself, it usually refers the child to another agency and monitors the
service agency's activities. Id. In Illinois, that agency is the statutorily created Department of
Children and Family Services. See infra note 69.
The first Illinois juvenile court had one full-time probation officer, six volunteer probation
officers, thirty unpaid police officers released part-time from their regular duties, and one
judge, Richard S. Tuthill, presiding. Law, supra note 13, at 1-5.
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an insurer of the parents' responsibility. 6 The juvenile court determined
when the state, as insurer, could act.
The 1899 Act simply required that the person having custody or control
of a delinquent, neglected, or abused child be served with process." The
child's care was in the hands of the parents, and the Act required the state
to serve them with process. The child, even though a party to the matter,
did not have to be given notice.' 8
Significantly, the Juvenile Court Act abrogated, at least to some degree,
the common law rights of the child. Prior to the Act, the law required the
child to be served in his own name before an Illinois court could exercise
jurisdiction. 9 A guardian ad litem, general guardian, attorney, or counsel
could not enter an appearance for an infant defendant until personal service
or constructive service had been made on the child. 20 Nor could the court
appoint a guardian ad litem for the infant defendant until the child received
notice of the suit. 2' Thus, the common law requirement of notice required
an essentially futile act: personal service on a person incapable of under-
standing the need of, or rights stemming from, that service.22 Presumably,
16. Law, supra note 13, at 1-7. In another context, the parens patriae model was also
analogized to a trust relationship, where the state is a "trustee" of a parent for the benefit of
the child's welfare when the parents fail to provide for the child's best interests. Brant, Last
Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337,
362-63 (1981).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 23, para. 173 (1901) (repealed 1965).
18. This principle was articulated in the 1905 case Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48,
62 A. 198 (1905). In that case, the court declared:
The Legislature surely may provide for the salvation of the child ... by bringing
it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all .... [The] state,
when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father . . . [is not]
required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hand upon the child to
lead it into one of its courts. When the child gets there, and the court, with the
power to save it, determines on its salvation . . . it is immaterial how it got there.
Renaissance, supra note 3, at 586 (citing Fisher, 213 Pa. at 50-53, 62 A. at 199-200). The
Illinois Act was deemed constitutional even though it deprived a child of his right to personal
liberty. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 111. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913).
19. E.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 63 Ill. 502 (1872) (for decree to affect minor, minor must
be served). The Campbell court held that due process of law referred to the course and usage
of the common law and is always based on notice. Id. Therefore, notice to the child, in the
child's own name, was required. Id. Thus, it was held that when service attempted on an infant
was given to the mother, "a white person above the age of 14, at the infant's usual place of
abode and explaining the contents of the writ," such service was inadequate and improper
when the mother's name was not given to the serving party. Fisher v. Fisher, 54 11. 231, 234
(1870). The formalities of serving process on an adult applied equally to infants and minors.
Id.
20. Bonnell v. Holt, 89 Ill. 71 (1878) (infant's appearance entered by attorney). See also
Chambers v. Jones, 72 Ill. 275 (1874) (infant's appearance entered by guardian ad litem).
21. Campbell v. Campbell, 63 Ill. 502 (1872). See also Chambers, 72 Ill. at 275 (general
guardian ad litem, not appointed by court, unable to enter infant's appearance).
22. The notice requirement, and the essence of service requirements, provides a party
[Vol. 36:343
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requiring this "futile act" would result in notice to the child's family,
kindred, or guardian who would then insure that the child's rights were
protected. 23
Under the 1899 Act, however, such parental "insurance" was unnecessary.
The state was the insurer of the child's care when the parents failed and
requiring notice to the child when the parents had already been served was
deemed unnecessary.24 The legislature must have realized the futility of
serving a minor in order to insure that the child's parents would protect the
child's interests, when the parents caused or contributed to the child's harm.
In effect, the requirement of futile service contradicted the reason for that
futile service when the parental "protectors" of the child's welfare were not
protecting the child. Whether by design or accident, the 1899 Juvenile Court
Act's "no notice" requirement to the child abolished the common law's
"futile act" service.
By 1964, the Juvenile Court Act became completely dependent upon the
basic 1899 parens patriae theory. 25 In fact, application of the theory swept
so broadly that the juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction over all matters
concerning a child. The court could issue orders of protection within the
child's home and could restrain acts within the home "deemed harmful to
the child.' '26 The court could also place a child in a hospital for treatment,
release the child on probation to his parents or custodian, call a guardian
before the court to report on his activities for the child, and provide for
continued guardianship until the child reached twenty-one years of age. 27
involved in litigation with due process. Manley Motor Sales v. Kennedy, 95 I11. App. 3d 199,
419 N.E.2d 947 (1981). Due process affords the party served an opportunity to be heard and
to protect and enforce his rights. Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 I11. 2d 405, 259 N.E.2d 282
(1970).
The common law, however, conclusively presumed that minors of a certain age were incapable
of understanding or acting on their own behalf. D. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW
616. Thus, they could not be held liable in tort if under seven years of age, and were not
criminally culpable if under eight years of age. Id. This presumption of incapacity to understand
the nature of process is still in effect, as evidenced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and other conditions of service under the Illinois Acts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2)
states that personal service cannot be made on an infant or incompetent person except through
a manner prescribed by state law. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l) (service shall be made
upon an individual other than an infant or incompetent by personal or abode service, or by
service to an authorized agent) with FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(2) (service to the minor in the manner
prescribed by the law of the state in which service is made). In Illinois, the Code of Civil
Procedure acknowledges that a person under thirteen years of age cannot accept service. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-203(2) (1985). The Juvenile Court Act acknowledges the same for
children under ten years of age. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 37, para. 704-3(5) (1985).
23. Campbell v. Campbell, 63 Ill. 502 (1872).
24. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. See also People v. Wethel, 202 Ill. App.
77 (1916) (public policy in Illinois for adoption proceedings that child not be served with
process).
25. Law, supra note 13, at 1-5.
26. Weiss, The Illinois Family Court Act, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 537.
27. Id. at 537-38.
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Significantly, the court could exercise jurisdiction over nonchildren. Adults
contributing to the delinquency, dependency, or neglect of children were
criminally tried in the juvenile court.28 The court also became responsible
for matters concerning broken families, traffic violations, adoptions, deter-
minations of paternity for children born out of wedlock, termination of
parental rights, and truancy.29
This interpretation of parens patriae assumed there was something wrong
when a family and child were before the court.3 0 Because the court viewed
the child as a victim of his environment, and the court's role under parens
patriae was to help the child, the juvenile court's jurisdiction expanded to
cover all persons and subject matter in the child's environment." Social
workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists prevailed; attorneys were rarely
involved in juvenile litigation.32 The juvenile court dealt with the child's
environment, rather than the child himself. Consequently, juvenile court
became known as a sociological court.33
Under this application of parens patriae, the sociological juvenile court
did not require notice to the child. Summons would issue to the person
having custody or control of the child, requiring that person to appear with
the child before the court.34 If no one represented the child, the court could
appoint any "suitable person" to act on behalf of the child.', If the child
appeared in court, however, with or without summons or other process, the
court could also proceed.36
In sum, the Juvenile Court Act, between 1899 and 1964, was based on
the theory of parens patriae intervention where the state was insurer of the
child's well-being. The parens patriae theory abrogated the common law
right of notice. The legislature viewed process on a "victim" infant as a
futile act because the parental "protectors" were accused of acting contrary
to the child's best interests. Delinquent children were treated like abused
children and the "no notice" requirement was applied to both, because both
were considered victims of their environment and therefore "faultless." The
parens patriae theory, however, soon came into question due to rising
delinquency statistics,37 severe criticisms of the juvenile court's effectiveness,"
28. Id. at 538.
29. Renaissance, supra note 3, at 587.
30. Law, supra note 13, at 1-10. See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 H~Av. L. REV.
104, 119-20 (1909) (the child is essentially good, and court's role is to determine what could be
done in his best interest to save him from "a downward career").
31. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
33. Law, supra note 13, at 1-9 to 1-10.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2007 (1963) (repealed 1965).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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and rising concern for civil rights.3 9 In 1965, the Juvenile Court Act was
completely discarded, and a new act took its place.4 Unfortunately, the new
legislation followed the historic treatment and combined delinquency and
abuse problems into one comprehensive act and, thus, again failed to treat
these different problems separately.
B. The 1965 Due Process Amendments
By 1961, the sociological juvenile court was at its peak. The 1899 Act had
been amended so often that it had turned into a confusing mass of incon-
sistent terminology and substance. 41 Juvenile delinquency was increasing. 42
As a result, the effectiveness of the parens patriae court when dealing with
delinquency and juvenile crime was questioned. 43 Civil rights activists si-
39. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
40. Juvenile Court Act, 1965 I11. Laws 2585 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras.
701-1 to 708-4 (1985)).
41. Trumbull, Proposed New Juvenile Court Act for Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 608, 609 (1965)
[hereinafter Proposed Act]. The commentator stated that the 1899 Act was:
riddled with inconsistencies of terminology and even of substance, is composed
of sections dismaying in their length and complexity and, by piece-meal amendments
and insertions, has become utterly baffling in the sequence of subject matter.
Moreover, there are on the one hand vagueness and omissions as to the rights of
the parties, the powers of the court and the procedure to be followed, and on the
other hand, surplusage consisting of detailed provisions for ... associations rendered
obsolete by more recent legislation.
Id. (citations omitted).
42. Renaissance, supra note 3, at 587. See also CHILDREN'S BUREAU STATISTICAL SERIES,
No. 85, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1965, at 2 (1966) (697,000 delinquency cases disposed of
nationally by juvenile courts in 1965, involving 601,000 children, or 2016 of all children between
10 and 17).
43. See Ellrod & Melaney, Juveniles Justice: Treatment or Travesty, 11 U. PIT. L. REV.
277 (1950); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957); Handler,
The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L.
REV. 7.
Further, the 1959 Standard Juvenile Court Act recommended that the minor, when it is
"appropriate to do so," should be notified and afforded an opportunity to have counsel.
STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT Art. V, § 19 (6th ed. 1959). President Johnson's Commission
commented on the inefficiency of American delinquency courts. In an oft-cited quote, the
report states:
[Situdies conducted by the Commission, legislative inquiries in various States,
and reports by informed observers compel the conclusion that the great hopes
originally held for the juvenile court have not been fulfilled. It has not succeeded
significantly in rehabilitating delinquent youth, in reducing or even stemming the
tide of delinquency, or in bringing justice and compassion to the child offender.
To say that juvenile courts have failed to achieve their goals is to say no more than
what is true of criminal courts in the United States. But failure is more striking
when hopes are highest.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80 (1967).
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multaneously challenged the lack of constitutional rights afforded children."
As a result, courts across the nation began to re-evaluate the juvenile court
system.
45
In reviewing the Illinois system, the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency recommended that the Illinois Act be completely revised to
comport with new trends in the juvenile law area, including the notice
provision.4 In response, the 1963 General Assembly created the Illinois
Commission on Children to re-evaluate and recommend changes to the Act.4 7
Upon completion of the final draft, the legislators on the Commission
sponsored the creation of a completely new Juvenile Court Act. 48 On August
5, 1965, the new Illinois Act was signed into law, and it repealed the 1899
Act when it became effective on January 1, 1966. 49
The 1965 Act attempted to balance the state's interest as "insurer" of the
child's well-being against the delinquent child's rights and liberties. 0 The
44. Renaissance, supra note 3, at 587 (citing the ACLU's 1956 criticism of the juvenile
court system). But see Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A. J. 719
(1962) (minor's right is to custody rather than liberty; he has a right to have someone take
care of him if parents do not).
45. These cases arose in the context of a minor's right to legal representation before a
juvenile court. See Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (child
has right to engage own counsel or have qounsel appointed); In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224
(D.D.C. 1955) (child must be advised of right to counsel); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 787,
241 P.2d 631 (1951) (juvenile court cannot deny constitutional right afforded to adults). Thus,
it was held that a minor child could claim a fundamental due process right to fair treatment.
Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
46. Proposed Act, supra note 41, at 608 (citing CooK COUNTY FAMILY (JUVENILE) COURT
AND ARTHUR J. AUDY HOME, AN APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CITATIONS
COMnTTEE AND THE FAMILY COURT 30 (1963)).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2191 (1963) (repealed 1965). The idea of creating a
specialized committee to evaluate and recommend changes was not an Illinois invention. The
governor of California had previously consulted a Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice
and, based on its recommendations, the state legislature passed a new Juvenile Court Act in
1962. Renaissance, supra note 3, at 590. In 1962, New York also enacted a new Family Court
Act. Id.
48. In particular, several members of the Illinois Commission on Children were members
of the General Assembly. Proposed Act, supra note 41, at 609 n.6. State Senators Cherry and
Gottschalk sponsored Senate Bill 388, and State Representative Peskin and others sponsored
House Bill 513, both of which were final drafts of the Commission's suggested legislation. Id.
49. Senate Bill 388 became the 1965 Juvenile Court Act, 1965 Ill. Law 2585 (codified at
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 701-1 to 708-4 (1985)).
50. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-2 (1965) (purpose of Act is to provide care
and guidance, serve minor's moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare and best interests
of community) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-20 (1965) (minor has substantial due
process rights enumerated). The legislature has long attempted to make this balance, and the
1965 attempt presaged subsequent Supreme Court decisions in this area.
For example, in the late 1880s, the Illinois Supreme Court tried to balance a child's
constitutional right with the state's interest as parens patriae. Compare People v. Turner, 55
Ill. 280 (1870) (committing boy to reform school held unconstitutional) with In re Ferrier, 103
[Vol. 36:343
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new Act required that the minor be served with process" and advised of the
right to be present,5" to be heard, 3 to present evidence," to cross examine,"
and to have counsel.56 In this way, it was thought that the procedural due
process rights of the delinquent child were protected from the state's parens
patriae intervention.
The Act specifically required that a summons and copy of the petition be
directed to the minor, and that the minor be personally served at least two
days prior to the date of the hearing." If no personal service was made, the
Act allowed service via certified mail or publication in a general circulation
newspaper. In 1967, the General Assembly allowed for substitute service
by allowing for a copy of the summons to be left with a member of the
family, aged ten years or older, at the child's usual place of abode. 9 The
substitute service was, perhaps, a concession to criticism that handing,
Ill. 367 (1882) (committing girl to "educational" school constitutional). As for the Juvenile
Court Act itself, the Illinois Supreme Court held deprivation of personal liberty constitutional
under the 1899 Act. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913).
Further, the United States Supreme Court would soon act in apparent accordance with
Illinois' 1965 revised Act. In 1966, the Court noted that recent studies and critiques of the
juvenile court system evidenced that "juvenile courts ... lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately in a parens patriae capacity." Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 566 (1966). Although the Court declined to decide the case on constitutional grounds
since applicable case law supported its argument, the Court expressed the nature of its due
process concern in a much cited quote. The Kent Court stated: "There is evidence, in fact,
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that
he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children." Id. at 556. One year later, the Court made that determination
in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Gault Court held that parens patriae did not preclude
due process protections, and a minor had a right to counsel, to confront witnesses, to cross
examine, and to remain silent. Id.
For purposes that will become evident later in this Article, an important point concerning
the Gault decision must be noted. The Supreme Court was concerned with due process rights
in juvenile delinquency, and not abuse, proceedings. Id. For current articles concerning this
due process/parens patriae dichotomy, see Note, Defining the Scope of the Due Process Right
to Protection, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 940 (1985); Note, Towards an Upstream Model of Child
Abuse in Illinois, 11 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 251 (1980).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3 (1965).
52. Id. at para. 701-20.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Although proceedings under the Juvenile Act were originally not intended to be adver-
sarial, the minor had a specific right to be represented by counsel. Id. If the minor was
financially unable to employ counsel, the Act required the court to appoint a legal representative.
Id. The court had an affirmative duty to inform the minor of this right, id., and the requisite
summons had to contain a statement that the minor was entitled to have an attorney present.
Id. at para. 704-3.
57. Id. at para. 704-3.
58. Id. at para. 704-4.
59. 1967 Ill. Laws 2359 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3(5) (1967)).
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mailing, or publishing notice to an infant was impractical. Personal or
substitute notice directed to the minor was mandatory.
Thus, the 1965 Act reinstituted the "futile act" service. Once again, service
of process was required on a child incapable of accepting or understanding
personal service.6 0 The child had to be served regardless of whether the
parents were served. Only then could the court exercise jurisdiction and
appoint a guardian ad litem.61
The Juvenile Court Act of 1965 was therefore concerned with affording
the minor basic due process rights. The new procedural requirements designed
to protect the juvenile delinquent substantially hindered the state's right to
intervene on the child's behalf. 62 Procedurally, however, abused or neglected
children were treated the same as delinquent children, and the requirement
of futile service applied equally to both types of juvenile "problems" that
the Act affected. 63 While an absence of a service requirement in the pre-
1965 Act protected abused children to the detriment of delinquent children,
its inclusion in the 1965 Act protected delinquent children to the detriment
of abused children. 64 Although the 1965 legislators did not perceive that their
continued practice of consolidating abuse and delinquent solutions into one
consolidated juvenile act would create a life-threatening problem, that is
exactly what would occur. In re Day, 65 arising more than twenty years after
the statute, first brought that problem to light.
II. IN RE DAY: THE PROBLEM COMES To LIGHT
By 1985, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act operated under a flawed notice
requirement. The pre-1965 Act did not require that process be directly served
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61. In re Couch, 131 I11. App. 3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69 (1985); In re Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d
783, 486 N.E.2d 307 (1985).
62. The 1965 due process rights were specifically created to correct perceived failings of
the juvenile delinquency system. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing
General Assembly's response to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency report). See
also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing national attitude of delinquency
courts). Although the state previously had broad powers to intervene, see supra notes 25-33
and accompanying text, the 1965 Act changed the philosophy of the juvenile court from
intervention eagerness to judicial restraint and emphasized due process concerns. Law, supra
note 13, at 1-12.
63. The court had jurisdiction for proceedings involving boys and girls who were delinquent,
otherwise in need of supervision, neglected, or dependent. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para.
702-1 (1965). The procedures for filing a petition, and the service requirement once filed, did
not distinguish between delinquency and abuse proceedings. Id. at paras. 704-1, 704-3.
64. The pre-1965 Act protected "victim" children, since all children were considered
innocent products of a detrimental environment. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, a child accused of a wrong was denied basic due process rights under the state's
benevolent intentions. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
The 1965 Act, however, afforded due process rights to a minor accused of delinquency or
wrongdoing. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the abused "victim"
child could not be brought into the state's protective reach until the procedural rights were
conferred. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
65. 138 II1. App. 3d 783, 486 N.E.2d 307 (1985), appeal denied, 490 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
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to the minor because the legislature must have realized that futile act service
through the minor to the parents was unnecessary when the parents them-
selves were accused of wrongdoing. However, under these circumstances, the
pre-1965 Act did not fully protect a minor accused of delinquency because
the notice requirement was eliminated altogether. In answer to this problem,
the 1965 Act required service to the minor, albeit futile, to insure minimal
due process rights under the assumption that the minor's parents would
protect his interests. The Act imposed, however, futile service onto abused
minors who had not been accused of wrongdoing, but rather had suffered
harm at the hands of their parents. The traditional consolidation of these
problems into a unified Juvenile Act created a Damoclean dilemma, a
dilemma best exemplified by the 1985 case, In re Day.66
Phillip Day (Day) was a twenty-three day old child born to Marshall
Eugene Day and Theresa Bragg. 67 He had suffered a severe fracture of the
right femur, additional fractures of the right tibia, humerus, and wrist, and
bruises on his buttocks. 6 The Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS)69 filed a petition charging child abuse, 70 and both parents
were served with process. 71 The parents consented to placing Day with
DCFS.72 On the date of the initial hearing, both parents, a court appointed
guardian ad litem, and a DCFS representative appeared, but Day was not
brought to court." After hearing evidence, the trial court determined that
Day was an abused child and that his parents, had "created a substantial
risk of physical injury to the minor ... likely to cause the impairment of
the bodily functions of the minor. ' ' 74 The child's injuries were specifically
found to have resulted from the parent's physical abuses. 7 The parental
rights to Day were therefore terminated. 76
66. Id. at 784, 486 N.E.2d at 307.
67. Id. at 784, 486 N.E.2d at 308. At trial, the expert testimony indicated that infant Day
had received injuries from "some sort of major trauma or some kind of twisting, fairly violent
injury indicative of the 'battered child syndrome.' " Id.
68. Id. at 784, 486 N.E.2d at 307.
69. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is an Illinois agency created
by the General Assembly. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 5001-5040 (1985). The agency's purpose
is to provide social services to children and their families. Id. para. 5001. Under the Juvenile
Court Act, DCFS may file a petition alleging juvenile delinquency, dependency, or abuse. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-1 (1985). DCFS's current budget is $226 million dollars. Chicago
Tribune, Oct. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
70. Day, 138 11. App. 3d at 784, 486 N.E.2d at 307.
71. In re Day, 490 N.E.2d 699, 700 (Simon, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 486 N.E.2d at 308.
74. Id.
75. Under Illinois law, if the parents are determined unfit, the court may commit the minor
"to an agency for care or placement." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 705-7(1)(c) (1985). Under
the adoption statute, parental rights can then be terminated and the child placed for adoption.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1501(D) (1985).
76. Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 785, 486 N.E.2d at 308.
1987]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The parents appealed, arguing that their son's due process right to notice
had been violated because he was not served with summons or notice of the
proceedings as required under the Juvenile Court Act.77 The appellate court
agreed and reversed the trial court's decision to terminate parental custody.7 1
The court noted, however, that service on a twenty-three day old newborn
was "an absurdity," especially when a guardian ad litem had received actual
notice of all pleadings and could ably represent the interests of the child. 79
77. Id. at 788, 486 N.E.2d at 310.
78. The court stated that, though absurd, it was the General Assembly's duty "to provide
an alternate means of service for a minor child when actual service is either impractical,
unrealistic or meaningless." Id. at 787, 486 N.E.2d at 310.
79. Id. at 785-86, 486 N.E.2d at 309. The appellate court based its decision on previous
cases concerning lack of service on an adult or child representative, noting that the Illinois
Supreme Court had "not yet spoken on the lack of service on a minor." Id. at 787, 486 N.E.2d
at 310. In particular, the court relied heavily on four previous cases, discussed below.
The first case, In re J.W. was an Illinois Supreme Court decision concerning a delinquency
proceeding. 87 Il. 2d 56, 429 N.E.2d 501 (1981). J.W. was a minor served with notice of the
delinquency charges, but no attempt was made to serve his parents. Id. at 58, 429 N.E.2d at
502. His mother, however, appeared at the adjudicatory and detention hearings, attended court
every day, and even testified on behalf of her son. Id. Thus, the mother had actual notice of
the proceedings, although she had not been actually served. Id. at 62, 429 N.E.2d at 504. The
court stated that requiring publication service for the minor's unknown father would "be
demanding a useless formality," and in important language further stated:
The lack of formal service in no way prejudiced the minor or his mother.
Considerations of fairness are all on the State's side: the respondents should not
be permitted to have an adjudicatory hearing, hoping for a finding in their favor,
and if they lose get a second chance by complaining of formal defects in service of
process that could and should have been objected to immediately, could have been
easily cured if timely objected to, and made no difference anyway.
Id. (emphasis added).' Thus, lack of formal service on the minor's parents was not fatal. Id.
Two years later, the Illinois Supreme Court heard a case with a related problem. In People
v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293 (1983), another delinquency proceeding, the state
served process on the minor and his mother. Id. at 78-79, 445 N.E.2d at 294. Prior to the
service and delinquency petition, the juvenile court found R.D.S.'s parents unfit, and appointed
DCFS as his legal guardian while remitting R.D.S. to the temporary care of his mother. Id.
Although it served the minor and his mother in the subsequent delinquency proceeding, the
state never served DCFS, the minor's legal guardian. Id. Since the Juvenile Court Act requires
service on "the minor and to each person" that is a necessary party, the failure to name and
serve the minor's legal guardian, a necessary party, did not properly invoke court jurisdiction.
Id. at 83, 445 N.E.2d at 296 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3(1) (1979)) (emphasis
in original). Thus, failure to serve the minor's legal representative rendered any court orders
void. Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court reiterated this position in the decision of People v. R.S., 104
Ill. 2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (1984). In R.S., the state failed to serve the minor's noncustodial
parent, his mother, while actual notice to his custodial patent (father) was sufficient. Id. at 3-
4, 470 N.E.2d at 299. Distinguishing In re J.W., 87 Ill. 2d 56, 429 N.E.2d 501 (1981), the R.S.
court stated that where a parent, or parent's address, is known, that parent is a necessary party
even if noncustodial. 104 III. 2d at 5-6, 470 N.E.2d at 299. Citing R.D.S., the court concluded
that "[a] pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding
fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void." Id. at 6, 470
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Nevertheless, the court found the child's due process rights violated because
he was not served with process and had not appeared in person before the
court.8 0
The Illinois Supreme Court, when presented with the Day infant right to
notice question, refused to hear the case."' Justice Simon, however, re-
proached the court's decision to deny the petition for leave to appeal.8 2 In
dissent, Simon stated that the Juvenile Court Act sought to ensure due
process notice to a minor, but that requiring process on an infant was a
N.E.2d at 300.
Lately, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, determined when notice to a minor
is required. In re Couch involved two children voluntarily turned over to DCFS until their
mother "was on her feet again." 131 III. App. 3d, 694, 695, 476 N.E.2d 69, 70 (1985). DCFS
first moved to have the children declared wards of the court, serving notice only to the children's
parents. Id. Three years later, DCFS moved further to terminate the mother's parental rights
to her children. Id. at 695, 476 N.E.2d at 71. In both cases, the children were not served with
notice. Id. at 695-96, 476 N.E.2d at 71. The appellate court stated that the notice requirement
of the Juvenile Court Act was mandatory to all parties, regardless of the age of the minor. Id.
at 697, 476 N.E.2d at 72.
It can be seen, then, that the cases relied upon by the Day court involved due process rights
of the delinquent minor or parents whose custody and control were involved. The J. W., R.D.S.,
and R.S. decisions all concern delinquency proceedings where the child was accused of wrong-
doing. J.W., 87 Ill. 2d at 56, 429 N.E.2d at 501; R.D.S., 94 111. 2d at 77, 445 N.E.2d at 293;
R.S., 104 IIl. 2d at 1, 470 N.E.2d at 297. In Couch, the court relied on these precedents to
determine that a child has a due process right to notice when the child has done no wrong.
131 Ill. App. 3d at 696, 476 N.E.2d at 72. For reasons more apparent in the Day decision, the
Couch court's reliance on the prior supreme court precedents was equally flawed. See infra
notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
80. Day, 138 11. App. 3d at 786-87, 486 N.E.2d at 309. The state argued, relying on J. W.,
that Day's parents waived any right to assert the- insufficiency of service because the lack of
service on Day did not prejudice the minor or the parents and that the lack of service was
not previously objected to. Id. In particular, the Day court stated that "there was certainly
no participation in the trial proceedings by the minor admittedly because of his infancy and
physical condition." Id. Apparently, the court would have held that Day would have waived
any jurisdictional or service defects had he physically appeared before the court. Id. (citations
omitted).
81. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315, a petition for leave to appeal from an appellate
court decision may be granted as a matter of discretion. ILL. S. CT. R. 315 (codified at ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 315 (1985)). The supreme court did not exercise this discretionary
power and denied the petition. Day, 490 N.E.2d 699 (1986). Justices Simon and Miller dissented,
with Simon expressing his reasons for granting the petition in a written opinion. 490 N.E.2d
at 699-701.
82. Day, 490 N.E.2d 699, 699-701 (1986) (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon stated:
Nothing is more common than for lawyers to disagree about difficult procedural
points, and as judges we frequently base our decisions on formal considerations
which appear trivial or technical to laymen. Occasionally, however, we are con-
fronted with a decision so singular in its complete departure from the realm of
common sense that rationalizing on it burdens on the impossible. In my opinion,
this is such a case.
Day, 490 N.E.2d at 699-700.
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meaningless act." Correct interpretation of the service requirement, Simon
maintained, merely required service upon someone capable of receiving it
who would represent the minor's interests.14 The appellate court's decision,
therefore, put the state in a quandary; to protect the child from his parents,
the state must serve the child through his parents. Simon concluded that
such an intuitively ridiculous proposition, especially when the parents were
already served in their own names, could not have been what the General
Assembly intended. 5
Whether Simon properly attributed logic to the legislature's actions, his
underlying assumption in the Day dilemma was correct. Simon recognized
that notice to minors is mandated to insure that someone will represent their
best interests. Since a minor is not capable of understanding or statutorily
accepting process,8 6 the futile act service is intended to put someone else on
notice. In that way, someone who does understand the rights and duties
stemming from notice will act accordingly. Under the due process notion, it
is presupposed that the parents or guardian will act in the best interests of
the child . 7 Such an assumption is clearly inapplicable when the parents are
accused of causing harm to the child's welfare. In such cases, Simon sanc-
tioned service for the minor to someone, other than the parents, who would
represent the child, such as the DCFS or a guardian ad litem.18 Only by
recognizing the difference between delinquency and abuse proceedings, and
by realizing that notice is inapplicable in abuse cases, would problems like
the Day dilemma be absolved and true protection of a child's best interests
be fostered. Again, however, the Illinois legislature inappropriately re-
sponded.
83. The statute clearly seeks to ensure that the minor will:have constitutionally adequate
notice of the hearing. In the case of a two-month-old infant, however, notice cannot be had
by summoning the infant in his own person because there is, of course, no way of apprising
the infant of the proceedings. Such a requirement would not only be meaningless, but impossi-
ble to comply with. Day, 490 N.E.2d at 700 (Simon, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. See supra note 83. Further, Simon noted that another section of the Juvenile Court
Act recognized the futility of serving a minor less than ten years of age. Id. (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-3(5) (1983) (substitute service)). See supra note 22 and accompanying
text for further discussion of this proposition.
86. Compare supra note 60 and accompanying text (due process reinstituted "futile service")
with supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text ("futile service" assures parents will act to
protect minor's interests).
87. Id.
88. Day, 490 N.E.2d at 701 (Simon, J., dissenting). Since the Juvenile Court Act authorizes
the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor's interests when they conflict
with those of the parents, Simon believed that the court should have the power to allow a
guardian to enter the child's appearance when the parents' interests are similarly in conflict
with those of the minor. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 704-5 (1983) (appointment
of a guardian ad litem)).
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III. THE PROPOSED 1986 AMENDMENTS
The Day decision stated that the notice provision of the Juvenile Court
Act, although an absurdity, should be changed legislatively, if at all.89 After
the Illinois Supreme Court refused to entertain the appeal, 9° the legislature
attempted to amend the Act. 9' By September of 1986, the General Assembly
had submitted proposed amendments to the Governor. 92
Through House Bill 2785, 91 the legislature intended to make certain changes
in the Juvenile Court Act. In particular, the bill was designed to amend
provisions about confidentially of records and adjudicatory hearing dates
concerning delinquency matters. 94 Amendment 2 of the bill was specifically
added to make two changes to the Juvenile Court Act's summons require-
ment. 9 The amendment deletes the requirement of service of process to
minors. 96 Instead, it allows summons to be directed to the child's legal
guardian or custodian.97 Furthermore, if the guardian or custodian is a state
agency, serving a copy of process on the person within the agency designated
for receiving service is sufficient. 98 On September 24, 1986, Governor James
Thompson issued an amendatory veto99 to the bill and sent it back to the
General Assembly, because of the delinquency-related amendments, not
because of the amendment to the summons requirement. '0
The amendments' consolidated treatment of delinquency and abuse will
have an anomalous result. The no notice to the minor amendment for both
abuse and delinquency proceedings will abrogate due process concerns in
delinquency cases.' 0' Moreover, when Governor Thompson considered all
the amendments as a package, passage of the uncontroverted child abuse
amendment was obstructed, and child abuse concerns were subordinated to
89. Day, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 787, 486 N.E.2d at 310.
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. H.R. 2785, 84th General Assembly, Regular Session (1986) [hereinafter H.R. 2785].
92. Telephone interview with Office of the Clerk of the Illinois General Assembly (Oct.
28, 1986). The bill was approved by both Houses of the Illinois General Assembly and was
submitted to Governor James Thompson on September 24, 1986. Id.
93. See H.R. 2785, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
94. Id. §§ 2-8, 4-2.
95. Id. § 4-3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Governor Thompson suggested amendatory
language as to the restrictions House Bill 2785 placed on the confidentiality of law enforcement
records. H.R. 2785, supra note 92, at § 2-8.
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
101. Once again, the state will not have to serve the minor and will be able to direct process
to the minor's parents, guardian, or state agency rather that the minor himself. See supra notes
96-98 and accompanying text. Service of process was required to insure that the minor would
be afforded due process rights when accused of wrongdoing. See supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text.
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delinquency concerns.' 2 Although the Day dilemma was solved, that solution
again raises questions as to due process rights in delinquency cases. 0
IV. THE SOLUTION
To resolve the basic inconsistencies of the Juvenile Court Act's notice
requirement, the basic premise of the Act needs to be examined. Ever since
the initial 1899 Act, Illinois has treated delinquency and abuse problems
equally, apparently due to the thought that "child" problems can be solved
by "child" legislation. °4 The General Assembly must realize that child abuse
and child delinquency are two separate areas of concern and, therefore,
should be treated in separate acts. If the General Assembly did this, the
rights and difficulties involved in both could be adequately addressed.
The pre-1965 Juvenile Court Act did not require notice to minors because
children were considered "victims" rather than wrongdoers. °0 Thus, there
was no need to serve the minor, whether abused or delinquent, because the
parens patriae model protected the child from the environment, including
the parents. Serving the parents was enough because the state protected and
represented the child's interests.
The parens patriae model failed, however, in a delinquency context. °6 In
that context, protection from the state, rather than the environmental factors
causing harm, is mandated. The advent of the 1965 due process notice
requirements presupposed that futile service to the child would create notice
to someone responsible for the child's interests. 07 A parent or guardian,
statutorily capable of accepting the requisite process, would therefore act to
protect the child from state proceedings.
Thus, different types of notice are needed. In child abuse cases, where
the parents are allegedly acting contrary to the minor's best interests and
the minor has not done any wrong, the parens patriae model is clearly
applicable. The child needs protection from the environment: the abusing
parents. However, in delinquency proceedings, where the minor needs pro-
tection from the state and has allegedly committed some wrong, the due
process model should apply.
In this way, under a child abuse statute, service on a minor would not be
required because the state would insure the child's well-being. Following a
102. Section 4-3 of House Bill 2785, responding to the Day abuse case, was attached to a
bill designed to make delinquency proceeding changes. See supra note 95 and accompanying
text. Governor Thompson's amendatory veto of these delinquency proceedings effectively stalled
passage of the uncontroverted abuse amendment. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (balancing between constitutional "due
process" rights and state's protection of children as parens patriae).
104. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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close approximation of the parens patriae model, the state could legitimately
intervene when the child's parents are allegedly acting against the child's
welfare. Due process, that is, protection from the state, would not be involved
when protection from the parents is paramount.
In contrast, under a separate juvenile delinquency statute, service on a
minor could still be required. Realizing that due process notions should
apply in quasi-criminal delinquency proceedings, the parents of a child may
still act for the child's well-being and insure the minor's rights. In this case,
"futile act" service would still be required, assuming that an alleged delin-
quent's guardians will work for the minor's interests.
In sum, child abuse legislation should be separated from delinquency
legislation, and correct measures of child protection administered. As a
result, the apparently conflicting due process/parens patriae models would
not conflict because due process would protect the delinquent child while
parens patriae would protect the abused child. The state's intention of
insuring the child's welfare could be preserved in either case.
CONCLUSION
From the initial 1899 Act through the 1986 Amendments, the Juvenile
Court Act of Illinois has erroneously attempted to solve the delinquency and
abuse problems of children through one unified piece of legislation. 08 The
state, attempting to act in parens patriae for abuse cases, 1°9 yet constricted
from intervening in delinquency proceedings because of due process rights
afforded the minor,110 has tried to find a middle ground for both. That
middle ground does not exist.
Only by recognizing the distinction between delinquency and abuse prob-
lems, and treating that distinction through separate legislation, can an ap-
propriate and effective solution be reached. When the parents are acting in
conflict with a minor's well-being, the state must have a legitimate right to
intervene in parens patriae. When the parents are not acting against the
child's welfare, due process rights can properly attach to the minor even if
such rights require "futile acts." By treating abuse separate from delin-
quency, both goals can be accomplished.
Illinois has attempted to correct the notice problem in child proceedings
with an 1899 mind-set."' The legislature has again failed to realize the
delinquency/abuse distinction,"' and the amendments"' will defeat the due
108. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113. Prior to publication of this Article, Governor Thompson signed H.B. 2785, and it
became effective January 12, 1987 (P.A. 84-1460).
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process rights of alleged delinquents.1 14 Only when legislators treat these two
distinct problems separately will the true interest of the state and the child's
well-being, be fully protected. At that time, the Juvenile Court Act will come
of age, rather than remain entrenched in its 19th century thinking.
114. See supra notes 102 & 104 and accompanying text.
